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Introduction  
There are several conceptual frameworks and methodological tools to understand how policies to 
alleviate poverty can be enhanced through the introduction of new variables. Sociology provides 
an interesting reference to examine the relationship between group identity and social policy 
through the prism of ‘recognition and redistribution’ that Nancy Fraser has proposed. From 
political science, we have the work of Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined communities’, whose 
various applications to different types of group solidarity in the global south have yielded rich 
results. In economics, Amartya Sen’s capability framework has expanded our understanding of 
development to include indicators of opportunity and freedom of social environment. In this 
context, behavioural economics is one of the most recent tools that uses inferences from 
psychology to understand human behaviour related to decision making. It uses observation, 
simulation and control experiments to qualify the assumptions of rationality made in neoclassical 
economics.  
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Studies over the last five decades since the formal inception of behavioural economics, have shown 
that the behavioural inferences are not only more realistic in theory, but also have important 
application in public policy design and implementation at the point of service delivery. The 
increasing significance of behavioural application in economics has been recognized by awarding 
the Nobel memorial prize in economics in 2017 to Richard Thaler, the father of behavioural 
economics. The two features - experimentation and observation as methodology as well as 
contribution to public policy delivery - makes behavioural economics more appropriate as a 
theoretical framework to examine how policies delivered for poverty alleviation are received and 
can be improved upon, leading to empowerment of the community.  
Examining the Neoclassical Model 
Standard economic theory uses neoclassical model (also called rational choice model) to 
understand choices and decision making. Neoclassical model has a set of assumptions about 
human behaviour. Primarily, the assumption is that individuals are completely rational, i.e., they 
use well-defined and ordered preferences to maximize their utility. Secondly, these preferences 
reflect the true costs and benefits of the alternative choices available. Finally, in situations of 
uncertainty, as more information comes in, individuals are able to update their beliefs about 
preferences using Bayes’ theorem of statistical inference (Camerer et al. 2003)1. Bayes’ theorem 
states the probability of an event with the help of prior knowledge of the conditions related to the 
event.  
 
1
 Camerer, C., ,Issacharoff, S., Loewenstein, G. ,O' Donoghue, T. & Rabin, R. (2003). Regulation 
for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism". University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review, 151 (3), 1211-1254.  
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In other words, there is no dichotomy between welfare and behavioural components of decision 
making in neoclassical economics because of revealed preferences (Bernheim & Rangel 2005)2. 
However, there are several studies that have examined the consequences of neoclassical 
assumptions about human capacities and the consequences of ‘revealed preferences’. For example, 
Berg and Gigerenzer (2010)3 define neoclassical assumptions as imposing unbounded self-interest, 
will power and computational ability on individuals. Bernheim and Rangel (2005)4 have explained 
that neoclassical assumptions involve coherent preferences, the presence of a preference domain 
in which preferences can be ordered, fixed life-time preferences and absence of error on the part 
of the individual concerned.  
As with the aspect of revealed preference, neoclassical model runs into criticism on the question 
of ‘rationality’. This is because the foundation of neoclassical assumptions is the rational nature 
of individuals that make them choose options to maximize their utility. In other words, being 
rational has consequences in a singular undifferentiated way. This type of rationality leads to 
‘expected value maximization’. That is why scholars like Gabaix et al. (2002)5 have argued that 
 
2
 Bernheim, B.D. & Rangel, A. (2005). Behavioral Public Economics: Welfare and Policy Analysis 
with Non-Standard Decision-Makers. NBER Working Papers 11518, The National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
3
 Berg, Nathan and Gigerenzer, Gerd (2010): As-if behavioral economics: Neoclassical 
economics in disguise? Published in: History of Economic Ideas , Vol. 18, No. 1 (2010): pp. 
133-166. 
4
 Bernheim, B. D., & Rangel, A. (2005). Behavioral public economics: Welfare and policy 
analysis with non-standard decision-makers (No. w11518). National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
5
 Gabaix, X., Laibson, D., Moloche, G. & Weinberg, S. (2002). Bounded Rationality in Economics. 
Presentation to the Behavioural Economics Roundtable, Summer Institute of Behavioural 
Economics, University of California Berkeley. Accessed on 22 December 2017. Retrieved from, 
https://eml.berkeley.edu/symposia/sage02/slides/laibson3.pdf 
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‘there is only one way to be rational’. However, expected value maximization was confronted by 
an intractable problem of choice called the St. Petersburg Paradox, that questioned the assumptions 
that related utility maximization and risk aversion. Daniel Bernouilli’s work on this mathematical 
conundrum dealt the inconsistencies in parts of the assumptions and this modification survived 
and grew as expected utility theory (EUT). EUT was the standard tool that was used to examine 
choices under uncertainty.  
Expected utility theory’s ability to explain observed behaviour was seriously limited further, by 
the coming of Allais’ paradox. Maurice Allais showed inconsistencies with the choices expected 
by EUT and actual observations (Allais & Hagen 1979)6.  Prospect theory, that began the 
behavioural trend in economics was an attempt to fix this mathematical problem. Gigerenzer 
(2008)7 and Güth (2008)8 have described the historical progression of prospect theory from EUT. 
While expected utility theory used transformation of pay-offs, prospect theory used transformation 
of probability to understand choices. Further strides were made when prospect theory was 
modified to include cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman 1992)9. Thus, both 
prospect theory and expected utility theory assume that choice emerges from a process of 
weighting and averaging (i.e., integration) of all relevant pieces of information. In other words, the 
 
6
 Allais, M. & Hagen, O. (1979). Expected utility hypotheses and the Allais paradox. Dordrecht: 
Springer.  
 
7
 Gigerenzer, G. (2008). Rationality for mortals. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
8
 Güth, W. (2008). (Non-) behavioral economics - A programmatic assessment.  Journal of 
Psychology, 216 (4), 244-253. 
 
9
 Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation 
of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5 (4), 297–323.  
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normative principles guiding the methodology of rationality through expected value maximization 
remains the same in both neoclassical and behavioural economics.  
Critiquing Neoclassical Assumptions 
Two viewpoints emerge with regard to the neoclassical methodological assumptions of 
behavioural economics. Scholars like Rabin (1999)10 and Bernheim & Rangel (2005)11 argue that 
normative principles of methodology of behavioural economics ought to be modified for selective 
application of the revealed preference principle. Even studies that critique the rational choice 
model fail to challenge this methodology question. For instance, Laibson’s (1997)12 model 
modifying neoclassical assumption consist of reducing the weights of future acts in favour of the 
present ones. Fehr and Schmidt (1999)13 have brought in ‘other-regarding preference’ in addition 
to self-regarding preference of individuals. Their ‘social expected utility model’ takes these other- 
regarding preferences but replicates the same methodology of preference ordering and weighting. 
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006)14 suggest that will-power problem can be fixed through dis-
 
10
 Rabin, M. (1999).  Psychology and economics, Journal of Economic Literature, 36 (1), 11-46. 
 
11
 Bernheim, B. D., & Rangel, A. (2005). Behavioral public economics: Welfare and policy 
analysis with non-standard decision-makers (No. w11518). National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
 
12
 Laibson, D. (1997). Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
112 (2), 443-477. 
 
13
 Fehr, E. & Schmidt, K. (1999).  A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 114 (3), 817-868. 
 
14
 O’Donoghue, T. & Rabin, M. (2006). Optimal sin taxes.  Journal of Public Economics, 
90 (10-11), 1825-1849. 
 
 6 
 
incentivizing mechanism like taxation. They cite ‘sin tax’ as an example of this concept. Binmore 
and Shaked (2007)15 critique neoclassical model as a representative of empirical economics in 
which the conflict of ‘fit’ and ‘prediction’ exists. They argue that the only way out of this dilemma 
is to make out of sample prediction tests with the generalizations of empirical data or theory. 
There are several scholars who have suggested a methodological review of neoclassical economics 
in this context. One of the most prominent and the first among them was Herbert Simon. Simon 
(1959, p. 279)16 in his seminal paper on reviewing neoclassical assumptions of economics 
trenchantly observed that, ‘how closely we wish to interweave economics with psychology 
depends, both on the range of questions we wish to answer and on our assessment of how far we 
may trust the assumptions of static equilibrium as approximations’. His observation was that there 
was a need in normative macroeconomics and management science for a fuller theory of the firm 
to understand the actual processes of making business decisions. He reiterated that the notions of 
adaptive and satisficing behaviour, drawn largely from psychology, challenge the classical picture 
of the maximizing entrepreneur. Second, he pointed out that the area of imperfect competition and 
oligopoly also pose the need for a methodological review. 
Various scholars have pointed directions that a methodological review might take. Rabin advocates 
the use of psychology in economics to enhance the parameters included in the utility function 
 
15
 Binmore, K. & Shaked, A. (2007). Experimental Economics: Science or What?, ELSE Working 
Paper 263. ESRC Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution. 
 
16
 Simon, H. A. (1959). Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioral Science. The 
American Economic Review, 49 (3), 253-283.  
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(Rabin 1999)17. Berg and Gigerenzer (2010)18 argue for an approach that moves away from the 
methodological singularity of neoclassical economics to a ‘toolkit’ approach’ that uses diverse 
tools to understand choice making process. They question the axiomatic assumptions of 
completeness, transitivity, commensurability and optimization of the utility function. They 
compare preferences in economics to traits in psychology and argue that rather than universal 
preferences, context specific matching of preferences and environment is more useful. They 
introduce the concept of ‘gaze heuristic’ as a method of approximation that goes into actual 
decision-making processing. They bring out the functionality of heuristics in making the individual 
achieve the stated goal where rationality is not necessarily a prerogative.   
Berg and Gigerenzer (2010)19 critique the tendency of behavioural economics to resemble 
neoclassical economics in two aspects (i) the use of psychological insights to fit the decision 
outcome data, rather than to explain them, and (ii) the use of axiomatic assumptions that are not 
empirically driven. The extent of empirical realism that behavioural economics brings depends on 
the correspondence between the model and reality. Berg and Gigerenzer (2010)20 argue for a non-
axiomatic approach called ‘ecological rationality’ that is derived out of behavioural strategies and 
the environments in which they are used. Deviations from expected behaviour is especially 
correlated with lower earnings, lower happiness, impaired health, inaccurate beliefs or shorter 
 
17
 Rabin, M. (1999).  Psychology and economics, Journal of Economic Literature, 36 (1), 11-46. 
 
18
 Berg, Nathan and Gigerenzer, Gerd (2010): As-if behavioral economics: Neoclassical 
economics in disguise? Published in: History of Economic Ideas , 18( 1), 133-166. 
 
19
 Ibid, p, 158 
 
20
 Ibid, p, 149 
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lives. The need for the ecological rationality project is that it performs the ‘veridical function’ of 
explaining the decision process alternatively to the rational choice model. 
 
Paternalism as a Regulatory Tool 
The question of methodological review in behavioural economics lead to various proposals and 
among them, the most prominent, choice architecture. Historically, paternalism has been justified 
under various contexts. In the 19th century, justification for paternalism rose from the skepticism 
of certain sections of people to make decisions in their own interests. Camerer et al (2003)21 
discuss the case of groups like ‘idiots, minors or married women’ who were treated as the wards 
of the state. The second type of justification for paternalism was in the case of preventing 
individuals from harmful choices that were detrimental to their long-term interests. Illustration of 
these regulations were health and safety regulation as well as laws that prevented selling oneself 
to servitude. 
Studies in psychology explain human behaviour through psychological and physiological needs 
on the one extreme and social institutions on the other. One of the options against direct 
paternalism is the idea of ‘planned behaviour’. Ajzen (1991)22 demonstrates how the theory of 
planned behaviour is a useful conceptual framework to predict and understand particular behaviour 
in specific contexts. Ajzen uses attitudes, subjective norms and perceived control of behaviour as 
 
21
 Camerer, C., ,Issacharoff, S., Loewenstein, G. ,O' Donoghue, T. & Rabin, R. (2003). Regulation 
for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism". University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review, 151 (3), 1211-1254.  
 
22
 Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational behavior and human decision 
processes, 50 (2), 179-211. 
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variables to understand behavioural intentions that could predict actual behaviour. He uses a 
combination of behavioural intentions and perceived control of behaviour to explain variance of 
behaviour. 
Another conceptual frame that some scholars propose attempts to understand irrationality. Jones 
(2001)23 has argued that although behavioural insights have implied that there is scope for law to 
modify its architecture, it is less clear how to design law behaviourally. He proposes three 
perspectives as a directive. The first step is to develop a theoretical foundation that can adequately 
encompass both rational and irrational behaviour. One way to do it is to partner both economics 
and behavioural economics with behavioural biology. Behavioural biology provides important 
methodological tools, robust theories, and data, useful in gaining deeper insights into the 
evolutionary forces that shape and influence all behaviour. Second, he proposes that a substantial 
and important subset of the irrationalities we have long ascribed to cognitive defect should be 
ascribed, instead, to cognitive design. Those irrationalities are likely to be products of ‘time-shifted 
rationality’,i.e.  the temporal mismatch between the environment in which natural selection shaped 
the brain to function and differentiate and the modern environments that technology has only 
recently enabled human mind to understand.   
 
Third, time-shifted rationality logically implies a principle, which can help us to better explain and 
predict the comparative difficulties legal frames may encounter in attempting to shift different 
behaviours. This aids in affording us a framework for estimating the relative steepness of demand 
 
23
 Jones, O.D. (2001).  Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral 
Economics Meets Behavioral Biology. North Western University Law Review, 95 (2), 1141-1206.  
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curves for various behaviours regulated by law. Thus, it gives an entirely new, modern, and 
biologically informed perspective on the underlying architecture of law, explaining why some of 
the larger features have developed as they have, and helping to differentiate between more 
probable and less probable features of future legal systems. 
 
The idea of choice architecture in which behavioural responses can be anticipated has been 
proposed and discussed in detail in behavioural economics (Thaler & Sunstein, 200824; Thaler, 
2015)25. Thaler and Sunstein (2008)26 have proposed choice architecture from the social and 
political priming frameworks that work with difficult choices and unpredictability. They describe 
the context in which behavioural priming or ‘nudges’ is beneficial. Their main argument is that in 
the contexts in which the benefits are in the present and the costs in the future, there is an explicit 
degree of difficulty in choosing various policy options. In such cases, the scope of using nudge to 
elicit desirable behaviour is greater. A choice architecture can be created by expecting specific 
errors and creating design mechanism enabling people to be less error prone. The implicit 
assumption of choice architecture is that there is a linear pathway from mapping choices to welfare.  
 
 
24
 Thaler, R.H. & Sunstein, C.R. (2008). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth and 
happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
25
 Thaler, R.H. (2015). Misbehaving: The making of behavioural economics. London: Penguin 
Allen Lane. 
 
26
 Thaler, R.H. & Sunstein, C.R. (2008). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth and 
happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
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Thaler and Sunstein (2008)27 have named their program ‘libertarian paternalism’ to bring out the 
element of freedom of choice in the nudging framework as well as the aspect of paternalism of the 
policy maker. Toward the end of their work, they qualify their concept with a caveat that choice 
architecture is best left to the guiding principle that policy designs should help the least 
sophisticated people, while imposing the least possible costs on the most sophisticated. They call 
it ‘asymmetric paternalism’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008)28.  
 
Camerer et al. (2003)29 look into ‘asymmetric paternalism’ as a form of paternalistic regulation. 
Their definition is that ‘a regulation is asymmetrically paternalistic if it creates large benefits for 
those who make errors, while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational’. They 
begin with the assumption that the true costs of various options in a decision setting can be 
assessed. Secondly, they assume that the true costs of various errors can be ascertained. Finally, 
they assume that individuals are boundedly rational in a given situation. Within this framework, 
the authors illustrate how policies can be framed that maximize benefits for the boundedly rational 
with minimum costs imposed on the fully rational.  
 
27
 Ibid, p, 4 
 
28
 Ibid, p, 249  
 
29
 Camerer, C., ,Issacharoff, S., Loewenstein, G. ,O' Donoghue, T. & Rabin, R. (2003). 
Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric 
Paternalism". University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 151 (3), 1211-1254. 
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Lipsey and Lancaster (1956)30 proposed the theorem of the second best in cases of deviations from 
the perfect market situations. They argued that the second-best solution in a situation in which the 
best solution is not possible may involve other deviations from the conditions that are usually 
deemed to be optimal.  Loewenstein, John and Volpp (2013)31 propose asymmetric paternalism in 
the context of decision errors on the premise of the theorem of the second best. They examine 
cognitive errors like default bias, loss aversion, present-based references, self-serving fairness bias, 
nonlinear probability weighting, peanuts effects, narrow bracketing, projection bias (hot and cold 
empathy gaps) and over-optimism. Their argument is that the same cognitive biases can be used 
to make the correct decisions in specific choice architecture frameworks. For example, default bias 
can be exploited in savings program by default opt-in option. Similarly, Greenberg (2005)32 had 
shown that framing and mental accounting of insurance schemes can be used to effectively reduce 
driving among consumers. Charitable giving can be enhanced by manipulating anchoring 
frameworks. 
Recent development in economics have provided new contexts for paternalism by examining 
regulatory frameworks. Amir and Lobel (2008)33 have examined the idea of choice architecture 
 
30
 Lipsey, R.G. & Lancaster, K. (1956). The general theory of second best. Review of Economics 
Studies, 24 (1), 11-32. 
 
31
 Loewenstein, G., John, L. & Volpp, K.G. (2013). Using decision errors to help people help 
themselves. In (Ed.) E. Shafir, Behavioural Foundations of Public Policy (pp. 361-379). Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.  
 
32
 Greenberg, A. (2005). Applying mental accounting concepts in designing pay-per-mile auto 
insurance products. Federal Highway Administration, Office of policy, Washington, D.C. 
 
33
 Amir, O.  &   Lobel, O. (2008). Stumble, Predict, Nudge: How Behavioral Economics Informs 
Law and Policy. Columbia Law Review, 108 (8), 2098-2137. 
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and paternalistic interventions to analyze predictability in human decision making and behavioural 
regulatory options available to policy. They suggest that some types of behavioural insights may 
be better translated into law and policy reforms than others. While behavioural insights can 
improve regulatory efficiency in systems with minimal intervention, these systems entail costs, 
distributional effects, macro coordination problems, and are inevitably value driven. Moreover, 
policy nudges serve merely as a first stage regulation whereas, more coercive measures are 
required at later stages. The idea of choice architecture is then related to the growing body of 
regulatory studies collectively termed ‘new governance’.  
Camerer et al. (2003)34 have discussed how the regulation of individual behaviour by institutions 
like the state can take one of the three forms. Primarily, regulations may be enacted with 
redistributive concerns of transferring wealth from the rich to the poor. An example of such 
regulation is taxation. In the second case, regulations may aim to increase net social benefits in 
case of a market failure like externalities due to public goods. An example of regulation of this 
kind is taxation to create public good infrastructure like roads. Finally, there may also be 
‘paternalistic’ regulations that seek to encourage individuals to make rational decisions in the face 
of cognitive limitations.  
There are various studies that have brought out the limitations of behavioural choice architecture. 
Examining retirement savings, consumer credit, and environmental protection, Bubb and Pildes 
 
34
 Camerer, C., ,Issacharoff, S., Loewenstein, G. ,O' Donoghue, T. & Rabin, R. (2003). 
Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric 
Paternalism". University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 151 (3), 1211-1254. 
 
 14 
 
(2014)35 analyze the social-scientific dimension of behavioural economics and recognize two 
categories of limitations. First, behavioural economics often artificially excludes traditional 
regulatory tools, such as direct mandates, from its analysis of policy options. It has also neglected 
the ways in which behavioural failures interact with traditional market failures and the implications 
of this policy design. Second, behavioural economics does not properly evaluate how its own 
regulatory tools actually function on ground. Nudges and choice architecture that behavioural 
economists have proposed might fail in many circumstances. The default rules so central to 
behavioural economics are better viewed as preserving the formality of choice for some, while for 
many individuals, functioning as effective mandates. The view that people can always rationally 
opt out has led policymakers to set these powerful defaults at the wrong levels, resulting in 
counterproductive policies. 
A number of studies have examined how behavioural policy given in choice architecture or 
through nudges work on ground. Disney, Le Grand and Atkinson (2013)36 have examined intrinsic 
behavioural motivation and concluded that behavioural incentives have a way of crowding in or 
crowding out intrinsic motivation.  In their study, they demonstrate that charging on environmental 
bad behaviour such as the use of plastic bags crowd in intrinsic motivation to discard plastic bag 
not only in the store concerned, but also across the behavioural spectrum. Slovic and Väastfjäll 
 
35
 Bubb, R. & Pildes, R.H. (2014).  How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why. Harvard  
Law  Review, 127 (1),  1593-1678. 
 
36
 Disney, K., Le Grand, J. & Atkinson, G. (2013). From irresponsible knaves to responsible 
knights for just 5p: behavioural public policy and the environment. In (Ed.) A. Oliver, Behavioural 
Public Policy (pp. 69-87). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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(2013)37 have examined psychic numbing or the situations in which large scale events alter 
predictable psychological responses. They conclude the need to educate moral intuitions to 
potential clients. Sah, Cain and Loewenstein (2013)38 have looked into the perverse effects of some 
behavioural goods like disclosure and transparency. Examining disclosure of information, the 
authors observe that having information is different from knowing what to do with it. From the 
point of view of the advisors, three consequences have been empirically observed when there was 
disclosure. First, there was strategic exaggeration, i.e., consciously exaggerating the bias in advice 
when disclosure was present. Second, disclosure creates ‘caveat emptor’ in the minds of the 
advisors that they are ‘morally licensed’ to behave less morally in the subsequent situations after 
disclosure. In fact, Cain et al. (200539; 2011)40 give empirical evidence that disclosure leads to 
conflicted advice by the advisers subsequently. Dolan (2013)41 has examined financial behaviour 
in changing contexts through behavioural tools such as messenger, incentives, norms, defaults, 
 
37
 Slovic, P. & Väastfjäll, D. (2013). The more who die, the less we care: psychic numbing and 
genocide. In (Ed.) A. Oliver, Behavioural Public Policy (pp. 94-109). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
38
 Sah, S., Cain, D.M. & Loewenstein, G. (2013). Confession one’s sins but still committing them: 
transparency and the failure of disclosure. In (Ed.) A. Oliver, Behavioural Public Policy (pp. 148-
159). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
39
 Cain, D.M., Loewenstein, G. & Moore, D.A. (2005). The dirt on coming clean: Perverse effects 
of disclosing conflicts of interest. The Journal of Legal Studies, 34 (1), 1-25. 
 
40
 Cain, D.M., Loewenstein, G. & Moore, D.A. (2011). When sunlight fails to disinfect: 
Understanding the perverse effects of disclosing conflicts of interest. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 37 (5), 836-857.  
 
41
 Dolan, P. (2013). Influencing the financial behaviour of individuals: the mindspace way. In (Ed.) 
A. Oliver, Behavioural Public Policy (pp. 191-208). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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salience, priming, affect and commitment. His conclusion is two-fold- (i) existing frameworks 
leave a substantial proportion of significance in variance with actually observed behaviour, and 
(ii) recent empirical studies bring evidence that even subtle changes in environment alters 
behaviour.  
Barr, Mullainathan and Shafir (2013)42 have brought out the context and decisional conflict as well 
as mental frames of accounting and attention deficits. They argue that institutions have a central 
role in informing thought and action of individuals. They analyze two types of financial 
regulations- home mortgage and credit card. In order to debias borrowers, full information 
disclosure, sticky opt-out mortgage regulation and ex-post standards-based truth in lending would 
be more effective than non-behaviourally induced regulation. In addition, institutions can also 
restructure relations between brokers and borrowers. Similarly, good credit card behaviour can be 
elicited through framing, salience in disclosures, opt-out payment for credit cards and regulation 
in late fees.  
Thierer (2016)43 has critiqued nudging and choice architecture based on the premise that risk and 
uncertainty has great value in learning outcomes. Explaining with the illustration of risk 
encouragement and growth of entrepreneurship in the European and American policy 
environment, Thierer argues that failing instills ‘risk-coping strategies’ in individuals and a 
 
42
 Barr, M.S., Mullainathan, S. & Shafir, E. (2013). Behaviourally informed regulation. In (Ed.) E. 
Shafir, Behavioural Foundations of Public Policy (pp. 440-464). Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.  
 
43
 Thierer, A. (2016). Failing better: What we learn by confronting risk and uncertainty. In (Ed.) 
S. Abdukadirov, Nudge Theory in Action: Behavioural Design in Policy and Markets (pp.65-94). 
Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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‘surplus of safety precaution’ must be avoided. Abdukadirov (2016)44 follows up the conceptual 
framework of nudge to ask the important question, who should design the nudge. Categorizing 
nudges as ‘market-based’ and ‘regulatory’, the author examines the grey areas where uncertainties 
prevent an effective design of nudges. For example, in areas like fuel use and energy there are 
uncertainties regarding how bias plays out. At the second level, there are scenarios in which the 
results of the lab emerge very differently in the real world. This has been termed as ‘the scalability 
problem’ by Mullainathan (Abdukadirov 2016)45. The information about the environment in which 
nudges operate is not transferred from the users to designers and this has been termed as ‘sticky 
information’.  
Under these conditions of varying real-world conditions, regulatory nudges by the government and 
market nudges by private firms have been compared. Abdukadirov (2016)46 argues that market 
nudges have the potential to diversify due to the properties of ‘customization’ and competition. 
Critiquing nudge from another angle, Beggs (2016)47 argues that both the government and the 
private sector have the opportunity to do either a ‘pareto nudge’ that is aimed at increasing 
efficiency or a ‘rent-seeking nudge’. One of the core insights of this differentiation is that there 
 
44
 Abdukadirov, S. (2016). Who should nudge. In (Ed.) S. Abdukadirov, Nudge Theory in Action: 
Behavioural Design in Policy and Markets (pp.159-192). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
45
 Ibid, p, 179 
 
46
 Abdukadirov, S. (2016). Who should nudge. In (Ed.) S. Abdukadirov, Nudge Theory in Action: 
Behavioural Design in Policy and Markets (pp.159-192). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
47
 Beggs, J.N. (2016). Private-Sector nudging: The good, the bad and the uncertain. In (Ed.) S. 
Abdukadirov, Nudge Theory in Action: Behavioural Design in Policy and Markets (pp.125-158). 
Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. 
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may be nudges which are beneficial to the individuals but not profitable to a private firm. This 
leads to a public-good type of situation. Therefore, there is a lot of scope for government 
institutions to act as the ‘nudger of the last resort’. However, choice architecture framework like 
nudging requires that the institutions that deal with nudges reflect on the long-term preferences of 
the individuals, focus on individuals who are not self-aware and deal with situations in which a 
nudge can replace a more distortionary or expensive policy option like a tax or subsidy.  
 
Choice Architecture as Public Policy 
Policy tools are techniques the government uses to achieve policy goals. Public policy formulation 
begins with policy goals which often use policy directives and policy opportunities to make target 
populations comply with the goals and engage in other forms of coproduction to promote socially 
desired results. The resulting citizen participation is the new feeder for new policies and an 
enactment of value allocation in society.  As early as 1975, Van Meter and Van Horn48 had 
discussed their seminal work on differentiating policy from performance and understanding how 
policies are effective on ground. They identified six factors in the process that converts policy into 
performance. They were (i) an environment that stimulated officials to perform; (ii) demands and 
resources that carry stimuli from the environment to policy makers; (iii) conversion process, which 
included the formal and informal structures and procedures of government, that transformed 
demands and resources into public policies; (iv) the actual policies that represented the formal 
goals, intentions, or statements of government officials; (v) the performance of the policy as it is 
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actually delivered to clients; and (vi) the feedback of policies and performances to the 
environment. Clearly, the emphasis was on the interaction between the receptive environment and 
actual policy process.  
Schneider and Ingram (1990)49 have argued that policy tools act as independent variables, 
initiating a chain of effects that have important political consequences. They present a framework 
of policy tools on the basis of their underlying motivational strategies. According to them, there 
are five kinds of policy tools that have a bearing on the behaviour of participants. First, ‘authority 
tools’ rely on the inherent legitimacy found in hierarchical arrangements. Second, ‘incentive tools’ 
assume that individuals are utility maximizers who will change their behaviour in accord with 
changes in the net tangible payoffs offered by the situation. The third category of ‘capacity tools’ 
assume that individuals may lack information, resources, skills, and may rely on decision heuristics 
(shortcuts or rules of thumb), but that these biases and deficiencies can be corrected by policy. The 
fourth type of tools called ‘symbolic and hortatory tools’ assume individuals are motivated from 
within, and that policy can induce the desired behaviour by manipulating symbols and influencing 
values. Finally, ‘learning tools’ assume that agents and targets do not know what needs to be done, 
or what is possible to do, and that policy tools should be used to promote learning, consensus 
building, and lay the foundation for improved policy. Public policies can be described in terms of 
their underlying behavioural assumptions, and variables can be created indicating the extent to 
which the policies rest upon different assumptions. 
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Behavioural economics can be used to design effective prescriptive programs for important 
economic decisions. Thaler and Benartzi (2004)50 have demonstrated with the ‘save more 
tomorrow’ plan that people commit in advance to allocating a portion of their future salary 
increases toward retirement savings. As firms switch from ‘defined-benefit plans’ to ‘defined-
contribution plans’, employees bear more responsibility for making decisions about how much to 
save. The employees who fail to join the plan or who participate at a very low level save at less 
than the predicted life cycle savings rates. Behavioural explanations by Thaler and Benartzi 
(2004)51 for this behaviour is bounded rationality and self-control.   
Dorward, Kydd, Morrison and Poulton (2005)52 have analyzed markets from the new institutional 
economics perspective to recommend policy reforms in a developmental context. They argue that 
stakeholder groups for the poor can be improved by focusing on non-standard institutional 
arrangement that neoclassical economics do not pay attention to. Furthermore, they argue that non-
standard institutional arrangement and understanding policy process are essential to mitigate ‘low-
equilibrium trap’ situations in which a majority of the poor spend their decision-making 
environment in. 
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Bernheim and Rangel (2005)53 have applied insights from behavioural economics to problems of 
savings, addiction and public goods. With the case of personal savings plan in the American 
context, they bring out behavioural problems like limited planning skills, tendency to self-reported 
errors and difference in consumption pattern close to retirement as significant factors that deviate 
from neoclassical assumptions about savings behaviour. The importance of default options, 
professional financial managers, social cues and intrinsic motivation are taken as factors that could 
improve personal savings rate. Similarly, issues of self-control and recidivism significantly affect 
addiction behaviour in individuals, making addiction a ‘decision process malfunction’. The authors 
prescribe policies such as supply disruption, policies affecting cues and self-control and 
eliminating counterproductive disincentives. In the case of public provision, the neutrality of the 
public good, the assumption that the wealthy must contribute more, the problem of public 
provision and distribution affect policy implementation. The alternatives would include looking at 
non-standard preferences and distribution issues in public goods provisioning.  
Babcock, Congdon, Katz and Mullainathan (2012)54 have shown how behavioural responses that 
explain realistic economic choices can be applied in designing labour policies in the American 
context. Reviewing select labour market policies such as unemployment compensation, 
employment services and job search assistance, they bring out how insights from behavioural 
economics help understand realistic responses to procrastination, complexity and labour market 
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expectation. For example, behavioural barriers to unemployment benefits include systematic bias 
and imperfect self-control. Besides explaining actual behaviour, design implications follow from 
this insight. Choices of job application based on such biased application of prior reference and 
biased wage expectation might lead to subsequent lower paid jobs. In this context, an effective 
wage-insurance structure upon re-employment might be to effect partial or full insurance that 
declines over time over job growth rates.   
Tyler (2013)55 undertook micro-level exploration of the behaviour of people within an 
organization with respect to two types of motivations- instrumental and social. His argument was 
that instrumental motivations such as environmental contingencies, investment, dependence, 
distributive fairness and instrumental trust were at the centre of self-interested behaviour. Social 
motivations such as attitude, values, social identity indicators, procedural justice and motive-based 
trust were the basis of co-operation. The social motivation indicators were empirically distinct 
from instrumental motivations, consistent over time and influenced co-operative behaviour. Tyler 
claims that co-operation is intrinsic and driven by compliance and achievement of group goals. 
The implication of this field study is the importance of organizational design in setting attitude, 
values and identity creation.  
A concept that has interested scholars is the idea of bias at the individual, systemic and expert 
levels. Pronin and Schmidt (2013)56 have analyzed bias into four different kinds- self enhancing, 
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self- interested, group-induced and cognitive.  The importance of categorizing biases lay in the 
fact that often, behaviourally there was a tendency to deny bias, confront naïve realism and have 
unconscious bias. As a result, in real-life situations there were both ethical lapses and conflict. The 
authors propose possible solutions such as perspective taking, disclosure norms and demanding 
objectivity. In a study of behavioural assumptions of employment law in the American context, 
Jolls (2013)57 finds that rationality, will power and self-interest are bounded and these limitations 
permeate various employment legislations of wage payment, pension, social security and age 
discrimination. Jolls focus on fairness dynamic in employment relations by which employers pay 
wages above employees’ reservation wage in exchange for increased efforts. But Jolls brings out 
the exemption categories of domestic employees and independent contractors to claim that there 
is a bias in the assumptions that underlie fairness dynamic. This bias presupposes that if employees 
behave appropriately without legal regulation, then markets should be left alone (Jolls, 2013)58. 
Brest (2013)59 have also examined the question of mechanism to debias policy makers themselves. 
Categorizing policy makers as individuals, counselors and policy makers, Brest looks at biases in 
adjudication, legislation and implementation of policies. In adjudicative fact finding and 
procedures, there are cognitive biases like anchoring, hindsight bias and confirmation bias that 
come into play. In legislation, trusting clinical rather than statistical prediction, availability bias, 
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affect heuristic, stereotyping and overconfidence distort rational law making. Similarly, at the 
decision-making stage, policy makers also wrestle with choice overload, context and value 
dependence, cognitive myopia, escalation of commitment and group dynamics.  
The role of the expert or policy maker has also come under the scanner. Fischoff and Eggers 
(2013)60 have examined competence of age-wise consumers, citizens and medically informed 
consent to understand the competency of intended beneficiaries of policy. Through a method of 
normative, descriptive and prescriptive analysis, the authors attempt educating policy beneficiaries 
through the involvement of subject-matter experts, decision analysts, social scientists and 
designers. Ubel (2013)61 examined the role of expert help that people resort to, when they are 
taking important decisions that are ‘preference sensitive’. Preference sensitive decisions are those 
in which the right choice depends on person’s specific preferences regarding risk and options. 
With the help of structured decision making in health care decisions, Ubel (2013)62 found out that 
knowledge does not prevent individuals from exerting biased choices.  He argued that the 
additional criteria for judging good decisions are the presence of expected utility criterion, 
reducing mispredictions, happiness criterion, invariance criterion and correlational validity. 
Invariance criterion proposes that the decisions should not change if pros and cons of the 
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alternative choices change. Correlational validity means that an individual participant’s choices 
should match their situational demands. For example, an individual in an advanced stage of cancer 
should opt for a more aggressive treatment method than those in the initial stages. Finally, the 
individuals should have stable time preference and adherence to the options that they have taken.  
Sunstein (2013)63 uses the conceptual framework of ‘misfearing’ to inform the impact of cost 
benefit analysis. Misfearing happens when individuals are afraid of trivial tasks and neglect serious 
ones (Sunstein, 2013)64. Sunstein points out that availability heuristic, informational and 
reputational cascade, and emotional and probability neglect are the reasons why people succumb 
to misfearing. Sunstein proposes cost benefit analysis on the grounds of cognitive misfunction, as 
a tool of regulation. 
In a seminal study on financial market participation and decision making, Benartzi, Peleg and 
Thaler (2013)65 examine the behavioural limitations such as hyperbolic discounting, inertia and 
nominal loss aversion that negatively affect asset allocation funds, equity market participation, 
retirement date funds and lifetime investment patterns. They propose choice architecture as a 
policy prescription against inertia and errors in savings decisions. The default option in choice 
architecture, for example, helps employees who take no action to still save for retirement as long 
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as the employer follows the prescription of automatically enrolling the employees to the plan and 
escalating their deferral rates periodically (Benartzi, Peleg & Thaler, 2013)66. Johnson and 
Goldstein (2013)67 have examined at default choices in decisions regarding organ donation, 
retirement savings, insurance, internet private policy and sex education policies in American 
context. They classify defaults as benign, random, personalized, persistent and smart defaults. 
They argue that default options significantly reduce effort through implied endorsement and 
sending reference for action. Thaler, Sunstein and Balz (2013)68 have analyzed choice architecture 
as a frame to pre-empt expected errors, give feedback, structure welfare in choices and include 
incentives in a choice architecture.  
Environmental problems are those that evoke less visceral reactions than others. In an earlier work, 
Sunstein (2006)69 had shown that people’s affective reaction to risk did not match the objective 
assessment of risks that statistically demonstrated the unpredictability of the outcomes or 
likelihood of adverse consequences. In psychology, Slovic (1997)70 had called them ‘dread’ risks 
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and ‘unknown’ risks. Individual reaction on environmental problem was delayed because the risk 
was in the future and the probability of adverse consequences seemed negligible at an individual 
level. Weber and Linderman (2007)71 had distinguished three forms of decision modes namely 
calculation-based (where analytical reasoning was used), affect based (on immediate holistic 
affective reaction) and recognition-based (depending on rules, laws and regulation). Colloquially 
terming these as decision by the head, heart and the book, the authors discussed how each of these 
modes can be triggered by modifying the importance and desirability of these goals. Using 
behavioural insights, Weber (2013)72 examines how environmental problems can evoke action-
based decisions. He uses social comparison and regret, mental accounting and framing as possible 
cognitive bias that can be effectively used in presenting environmental issues. Similarly, he 
suggests that shifting the decision-making unit from individuals to groups can have a positive 
effect on environmental issues. In another study on risk assessment and behaviour in natural 
catastrophes, Kunreuther, Meyer & Michel-Kerjan (2013)73 point out the gap between investment 
and mitigation gap. Heuristics in budgeting, temporal planning, underweighting the future, 
underestimating the risk, affecting forecasting risks, learning failures, social norms and 
interdependencies, the authors examine strategies for overcoming bias by looking at long term 
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insurance and mitigation loans, tax incentives and zoning ordinance that incorporate and 
communicate environment risk.  
Behavioural Development Economics 
The applications of behavioural insights have special significance in understanding decision 
making in the context of poverty. Kanbur (2002)74 anticipated the three main turns in mainstream 
economics that shifted the conceptual analysis in the recent decades. He observed that behavioural 
economics based on psychological empiricism and development and distributional economics 
based on micro foundations redefined three questions - the foundations of poverty and inequality 
studies and delivery of services. In his 2003 paper75, he elaborates on the changing paradigm of 
development economics that increasingly analyzes decision making within a psychological 
paradigm in microstudies. He cites how insights from behavioural applications over and above 
rational and informational framework may be useful in understanding informal arrangements and 
supposedly short-term decisions of poor people or informal workers in agriculture.  
Amir et al. (2005)76 identified a few areas of economics in which behavioural insights would have 
an impact on policy prescription. They came up with cases where there was a problem of 
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anchoring, framing, hot-cold emotional gap, addiction issues, interventions regarding financial and 
public health habits as probable research fields. They also proposed process routes by which 
behavioural insights can be incorporated into the policy. Their first suggestion was ‘grassroots’ 
approach through which community behaviour is changed to reflect the behavioural insight. The 
second and third method is to make behavioural insights a part of core economic policy and law.  
Bertrand, Mullainathan and Shafir (200477; 2006)78 have shown that poor people tend to make 
similar kinds of decision errors but the circumstance of poverty impose greater costs on these 
errors than in other situations. In addition to this, people who are better-off are operating in a 
system that strives to reduce behavioural errors through no-fee options, reminders and default 
options where as poor people face institutional, social and psychological barriers that make their 
economic decision-making overwhelming. The authors use four factors in the conceptual 
framework to understand low participation of poor people in the American context. The first is the 
concept of mental construal. Behavioural sciences reveal that people do not respond to objective 
stimuli but mental representations of actual conditions which do not render a one-to-one 
correspondence (Bertrand, Mullainathan & Shafir 2004)79.  Therefore, many well-intentioned 
interventions can fail because they have been misunderstood by the intended beneficiaries. The 
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key to success in policy delivery is not only conveying the correct information, but the correct 
mental construal as well.  
Shah, Mullainathan and Shafir (2012)80 have demonstrated how scarcity affects cognitive 
performance. From empirical studies, they observe that scarcity changes the allocation of attention 
by emphasizing some matters more deeply and neglecting others. This can explain behavioural 
tendencies like over borrowing. They argue that scarcity-induced focus is not myopia, nor does it 
necessarily imply steeper discount rates. The poor often save for the future, not by setting aside a 
generic amount but by saving up for specific expenses. Understanding this behavioural trait of the 
poor has policy implications. For example, interventions that draw people’s attention to specific 
future needs should be particularly effective at increasing savings.   
Mullainathan and Shafir (2013)81 analyze the decision-making contexts of the poor to bring out 
the environment of poverty that fosters certain cognitive limitations. They argue that context 
dependence, mental construal, mental accounting, channel factors and identity significantly affect 
the behavioural performance of the poor. Institutions, they argue, specifically shape defaults, 
behaviour and implicit planning. Some of the non-institutional characteristics in the financial life 
of the poor are the presence of the economic slack by which the poor easily cut back on 
consumption. Secondly, the poor do not have a buffer-stock savings despite high volatility. The 
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authors argue that decision under scarcity, therefore, suffer from limited cognitive resources, 
mental load, stress and tunneling and depleted resources and limited self-control.  
Datta and Mullainathan (2014)82 have looked at design of development policies to include 
behavioural fixes in agrarian context. They suggest parameters like mental frame suggestions to 
deal with inattentiveness and self-control problems. Kuriakose (2016)83 has argued that 
infrastructure and specific social norms are important components of behavioural policy design in 
a development context like that of India. 
The second conceptual framework is the power of situational influence on personality traits. A 
number of psychological experiments have shown the relationship between external situational 
impacts and its consequences on behavioural choices (Milgram 196384; Darley & Bateson 1973)85. 
The third factor is the presence or absence of a channel that encourages or inhibits behaviour 
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(Lewin 195186; Leventhal, Singer & Jones 1965)87. The fourth set of factors are the cognitive 
principles of behavioural economics such as risk seeking in times of loss (Kahneman & Tversky 
1979)88, loss aversion (Tversky & Kahneman 1991)89 and mental accounting (Thaler 1985)90. 
These characteristics go against the assumptions of neoclassical economics. For example, mental 
accounting is a practice that contradicts the idea that money is fungible. Due to such cognitive 
barriers, behavioural policy should take into account processes like creating correct channels of 
communication, appealing to the right identities and creating helpful infrastructure to process 
information. 
The third concept that is much studied in behavioural developmental economics is the idea of 
rationality that is influenced by the environment. Smith (2005)91 has theorized on the difference 
between the rationalities of wealth maximization and that of survival. He argues that the first 
concept of a rational order derived from the standard socioeconomic science models is an example 
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of what Hayek has called ‘constructivism’, which stems particularly from philosophers who 
believed and argued that all worthwhile social institutions were and ought to be created by 
conscious deductive processes of human reason. In the 17th century, its proponent was Descartes 
while in the 19th century, Bentham and John Stuart Mill were among the leading constructivists. 
Constructivism used reason to deliberately create rules of action, and designed human 
socioeconomic institutions that yielded outcomes deemed preferable, given particular 
circumstances, relative to those produced by alternative arrangements. The shortcoming of 
constructivism was that human institutions and most decision making was not guided only or even 
primarily by constructivism. Emergent arrangements, even if initially constructivist in form must 
have survival properties that take account of opportunity costs and environmental challenges 
invisible to our modeling efforts.  
 
Smith argues that these considerations led to the second concept of a rational social order, i.e., an 
ecological system, which emerges out of cultural and biological evolutionary processes, home 
grown principles of action, norms, traditions, and ‘morality’. Ecological processes help in the 
process of selection. For example, in experimental economics revealed processes such as the 
continuous double auction (CDA) emerge in numerous studies of existing market institutions. 
People in these experiments are led to promote group welfare enhancing social ends that are not 
part of their original intention. This principle is supported by hundreds of experiments whose 
environments and institutions (sealed bid, posted offer and others besides CDA) may exceed the 
capacity of formal game-theoretic analysis to articulate predictive models. But they do not exceed 
the functional capacity of collectives of incompletely informed human decision makers, whose 
 34 
 
autonomic mental algorithms coordinate behaviour through the rules of the institutions and social 
algorithm to generate high levels of measured performance.  
 
Smith (2005)92 concludes that both kinds of rationality have influenced the design and 
interpretation of experiments in economics. In other words, experimental market economics and 
behavioural economics are in principle complementary. Experimental economists study market 
performance given individual valuations, while cognitive psychologists study the performance 
consistency of individual decision making. 
 
Drawing on thirty in-depth interviews with leading policy executives, and case studies that reflect 
the application of ‘Behaviour Change’ policies on the design and constitution of British streets, 
Whitehead, Rhys and Pykett (2011)93 claim that current strategies are predicated on a partial 
reading of new behavioural theories, leading to the construction of public policies that seek to 
arbitrarily decouple the rational and emotional components of human decision making with 
deleterious social and political consequences. Their argument is that if humans are seen as slaves 
of their emotional selves, it appears that only those choice architects who design public policy can 
be trusted to design the rational default environments in which we are to live (with, of course, the 
exception of the `rational elite' for whom these policies are not really meant in the first place). It 
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is this conceit that lies at the root of both the democratic shortcomings of Behaviour Change 
policies, and its unfortunate psychographic designation of irrational social groupings. 
The fourth aspect that has been examined by various studies is the idea of ‘psychological levers’ 
and the environment. Miller and Prentice (2013)94 have looked at the psychological levers of 
behaviour. Relying on Lewin’s theory of motivation, the authors argue that behaviour occurs in a 
‘force-field‘, with opposing pressures on an individual. For instance, pressures that push an 
individual towards a goal or outcome is called ‘approach motivation’ where as pressures that push 
a person away from an action is called avoidance motivation. The authors begin policy prescription 
by asking two questions - what is the behavioural target of this policy and what is its psychological 
targets? Social norm marketing and calibrating counterintuitive aspects of policies apparent in 
cases of taxes and subsidies are the examples that they provide to design policies that would trigger 
behavioural change. In policy design analysis, Garcia and Cohen (2013)95 look at circumstances 
where identity is a central concern in psycho-sociological approach in a ‘social tension system’ in 
which forces in a dynamic state of action remain stable over a long time (Garcia & Cohen, 2013)96. 
While intervening in identity related process in classroom performance, for instance, the timing, 
psychology and related effects become very important considerations. 
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Decision making varies significantly when done individually and in group. Both formal and 
informal institutions play an important role in the policy environment in a developing context. 
Cardenas and Carpenter (2008)97 have studied from field experiments in cross-national developing 
contexts to understand the role of formal and informal institutions in enhancing cooperative 
behaviour. They test the groups in cooperation, trust and reciprocity, fairness and altruism and 
time preference and risk. Social norms, social sanctioning, and group composition affect 
cooperation by exerting informal rules. Where formal rules exist, social cooperation is less. 
Studies of behavioural applications in public health have faulted the assumption of aggregation of 
individual evidence to a group (Hoddinott, Allan, Avenell & Britten 2010)98. Studying specific 
health interventions, they argue that behaviour change interventions delivered in a group setting 
are complex adaptive social processes with interactions between the group leader, participants, and 
the wider community and environment. Therefore, ecological models of health improvement, 
which embrace the complex relationship between behaviour, systems and the environment may be 
more relevant than an individual approach to behaviour change.  
Kooreman and Prast (2010)99 studied public health choices such as organ donations and lifetime 
savings through the behavioural lens in the case of the Netherlands. They demonstrate that policies 
with more choices and competition evoke consumer confusion and choice paralysis. The authors 
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also suggest that policy initiatives based soft-paternalism should be preceded by an analysis of 
costs and benefits and on design that recognizes consumer heterogeneity. They explain how pilot 
programs could be an effective way forward to gauge policy effectiveness. 
Baickar, Congdon and Mullainathan (2012)100 use the psychology of decision making to health 
insurance in the American context. They argue that psychological insights simplify both the nature 
of the problem (including barriers to enrollment and socially optimal coverage patterns) and the 
effectiveness of different policy solutions (including overall take-up and targeting of particular 
populations). For example, employer depended insurance and reference dependent prescription 
lead to low take-up of insurance cover because of commitment issue and free-rider problems. 
Fewer choice options and decision inertia plague these insurance policies although the provisions 
of these policies are beneficial to the poor sections. Simple behavioural design solution like 
nudging, selection and non-group insurance may be more effective. 
Michie et al. (2008)101 attempted a taxonomy of behavioural techniques and linked it to 
theoretically linked behavioural changes. Their process was to review available behavioural 
techniques, map them into behavioural determinants in meta-analysis. They concluded that there 
were 10 identifiable theoretical constructs informed by psychology and 137 techniques despite the 
shortcoming that they began with no definition of what a technique is. Michie, Straalen and West 
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(2011)102 have conceptualized a behaviour change wheel to identify the framework of behavioural 
change interventions based on reliability test in public health interventions. According to the 
authors, a ‘behavioural system’ was composed of three conditions- (i) capability, (ii) opportunity, 
and (iii) motivation. The authors also proposed nine interventions that could come in when one or 
more of the conditions are in deficit and seven type of policies that would enable the interventions.  
Several studies that have used empirical observation and lab experiments in the field have observed 
the psychological dilemmas that the poor people are subjected to, due to their financial constraints. 
Cognitive resources play an important role in economic behaviour because they facilitate 
economic deliberation and global decision-making. Orwell (1937)103 traveled to the north of 
England during the Great Depression to learn about the lives of the poor and emphasized the 
difficult budget decisions the poor had to make about what not to buy. He described it as the 
‘psychological adjustment’ inherent in the dilemmas of the poor, necessary to avoid ‘continued 
agonies of despair’.  In her history of poor and pregnant women in nineteenth-century Paris, Fuchs 
(1992)104 explains how ‘women made choices, albeit without adequate information, without many 
options, and without much planning’ which led them to resort to infanticide or child abandonment. 
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Burks, Carpenter, Götte, and Rustichini (2009)105 found that in addition to choosing larger, later 
payments in the lab, truck drivers with better performance on cognitive tests are more likely to 
keep their job long enough to avoid incurring a costly debt for training. Collins, Morduch, 
Rutherford, and Ruthven (2009)106 collected detailed ‘financial diaries’ from poor households in 
Bangladesh, India, and South Africa, documenting the complexity and difficulty of the 
intertemporal financial decisions that the poor must make to manage their small and irregular 
incomes. 
  
Temptation goods are defined to be the set of goods that generate positive utility for the self that 
consumes them, but not for any previous self that anticipates that they will be consumed in the 
future. In their work comparing temptation good and decision making in poor, Banerjee and 
Mullainathan (2010)107 argue that the relation between temptations and the level of consumption 
plays a key role in explaining the observed behaviours of the poor. The assumption of declining 
temptations, which says that the fraction of the marginal dollar that is spent on temptation goods 
decreases with overall consumption, has a number of striking implications for the investment, 
savings, borrowing and risk-taking behaviour of the poor, which would not arise if temptations 
were either non-declining or entirely absent.  
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In a field experiment among pension recipients in Cape Town, consumption declines less steeply 
across the pension month among participants who show more cognitive ability on a working-
memory test (Spears, 2012)108. Spears (2011)109 based on three randomized and partially 
randomized control experiments demonstrated that poverty is associated with diminished 
behavioural control.  
 
Mani, Mullainathan, Shafir and Zhao (2013)110 have demonstrated through cognitive experiments 
that poverty significantly reduces cognitive performance. In a set of two experiments, thought 
stimuli about finances were given to poor and well-off participants. The poor participants showed 
significantly less capability than the rich. Similarly, in the second experiment with a set of farmers, 
the same participants exhibited increased cognitive performance after their harvest when they were 
richer than before the harvest. The magnitude of impact on the ‘cognitive load’ that poverty 
imposes is significantly high as shown by sleep researchers. Statistical average in a population 
equates financial concerns as having a pressure equal to losing a night of sleep or approximately 
13 IQ points.  
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On the psychology of poverty, Haushofer and Fehr (2014)111 argue that poverty causes stress and 
negative affective states which lead to short-sighted and risk-averse decision-making, by limiting 
attention and favoring habitual behaviours at the expense of goal-directed ones. These 
relationships constitute a feedback loop that contributes to the perpetuation of poverty. On policies 
to counter poverty effects, they propose three methods. The first is to target poverty directly 
through mechanisms like cash transfers. The second is to target its psychological consequences, 
which can be through psychotherapeutic interventions. This is the least studied behavioural 
intervention. The third is to target the economic behaviours that result from them, which have been 
combated by behavioural economists to an extent.    
Conclusion 
This article examined the shortcomings of neoclassical assumptions regarding choices and 
decision making by individuals. The assumptions of revealed preferences and rationality as utility 
maximization were critiqued based on empirical evidence. Behavioural economics, that developed 
out of psychological examination of choices and decision making modified the neoclassical 
assumptions by bringing in cognitive limitations of human rationality and proposed frameworks 
such as choice architecture to nudge individuals towards utility maximization. However, the 
methodology of neoclassical and behavioural economics remain the same. 
Within the framework of new psychological variables, behavioural economics was examined as 
regulatory policy and public policy. As regulatory policy, behavioural consequences are different 
when applied by a public authority like the state and an institution like the market. While markets 
provide customization and competition, public institution takes into account externalities. As 
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public policy, behavioural insights have been implemented in lab conditions and pilot projects to 
combat various types of cognitive limitations. Studies have been conducted on biases, the role of 
experts, decision making as individuals and in groups. However, there have also been criticism 
against behavioural economics on two grounds. The first is that behavioural results from lab 
conditions play out very differently in the field due to various reasons. The second line of critique 
is because there is genuine difficulty in implementing asymmetric paternalism as a systematic 
method of policy under all circumstances. 
It is in this context, that the third part of the article (the first part deals with critiquing neoclassical 
model and the second part discusses aspects of behavioural economics) dealt with a special field 
of enquiry within the discipline of behavioural economics called behavioural developmental 
economics. Various studies have shown the cognitive burden that a condition of scarcity like 
poverty imposes on individual decision-making capabilities. This acute cognitive limitation calls 
for sensitive and insightful policy architecture in which decision making in poverty can be better 
understood and enhanced towards welfare maximizing goals.  
 
